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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the role played by selectivity issues induced by 
nonemployment in explaining gender wage gap patterns in the EU since the onset of the 
Great Recession. We show that male selection into the labour market, traditionally 
disregarded, has increased. This is particularly the case in peripheral European countries, 
where dramatic drops in male unskilled jobs have taken place during the crisis. As regards 
female selection, traditionally positive, we document mixed findings. While it has declined 
in some countries, as a result of increasing female LFP due to an added-worker effect, it 
has become even more positive in other countries. This is due to adverse labour demand 
shifts in industries which are intensive in temporary work where women are over-
represented. These adverse shifts may have more than offset the rise in unskilled female 
labour supply. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we look at how changes in selection into the labour market by men and
women have impinged on the evolution of gender wage gaps since the beginning
of the Great Recession (henceforth, GR in short)1 We focus on this period because
the scale of employment adjustments have been very large during the recent slump,
and these shifts are the ones that often underlie selection decisions into the labour
market. In addition, our evidence pertains to a large cross-section of European Union
(EU) countries because some of them have been subject to a deeper and lengthier
downturn than other developed areas. In effect, the GR in Europe not only covers
the global financial crisis in 2008-09 but also includes the subsequent sovereign debt
crisis in the Euro area from late 2009 to mid 2012.
Figure 1: Changes in the median gender wage gap before and after the GR.
AUT BEL
DNK
ESP
FIN
FRA
GER
GRC
IRL
ITA
NLD
NOR
PRT
UK
-
10
-
5
0
5
W
ag
e 
G
ap
 C
ha
ng
e 
(pp
.), 
20
07
-20
12
-10 -5 0 5
Wage Gap Change (pp.), 2002-2007
Observed Change
45 degree line
Source: OECD data and authors' calculations.
Note: The median gender wage gap is unadjusted.
A number of recent reports, most notably OECD (2014), have documented that
raw (unadjusted) gender pay gaps (hereafter denoted as RG) have narrowed in several
EU countries between 2007 and 2012 (the latest available date in the OECD reports).
This is illustrated in Figure 1 where percentage point (pp.) changes in median RG in
several EU economies between 2007 and 2012 (vertical axis) are plotted against their
corresponding changes prior to the GR, between 2002 and 2007 (horizontal axis). As
can be inspected, reductions in RG that took place in most European countries before
the crisis have remained afterwards.2 Furthermore, as OECD (2014) also documents,
1More precisely the gender pay gap is defined in the sequel as the difference between male and
female wages in log points.
2Finland, Italy and Portugal are the exceptions before the GR, whereas France and The Netherlands
happen to be so during the crisis.
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gender convergence has not only taken place in pay terms: gender gaps in employ-
ment and unemployment have also narrowed down substantially during this period,
relative to longer-term convergence trends since the postwar period.
Several explanations have been put forward to rationalize these time patterns.
For example, it has been argued that reductions in RG are largely the result of a
“levelling down” of male wages as well as of the rise in male unemployment, rather
than of actual gains made by women. For example, Bettio et al. (2012) point out that
the extra wage components (bonuses and premiums) often included in pay packages
are the ones first to be foregone in a recession and that this variable pay component
often accrues disproportionately to men. Likewise, it is argued that women are over-
represented in the public sector (where gender pay gaps are generally lower), and
under-represented in the sectors that have shed more labour and where men tend to
earn well. Finally, it is also mentioned that some countries have implemented early
retirement policies, mainly as a way to alleviate social pressure against collective
dismissals and to facilitate youth employability. Since men are a majority among
elderly workers with long professional careers, these policies may be also behind
lower observed male wages.
All this evidence raises interesting questions about the factors underlying this
increasing gender pay equalization since the GR. Yet, they do not often take into
consideration whether the time patterns of RG on the basis of reported wages remain
similar once these pay gaps are corrected for selectivity issues, which differ by gender.
It is widely acknowledged that labour-market selection issues could be crucial
in some specific EU countries. In particular, using several imputation techniques
to correct for non-employment among females, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) have
shown that gender gaps in median wages on imputed (rather than on reported) wage
distributions became more sizeable in southern Europe up to the early 2000s. By con-
trast, they remained similar in the UK and most central and northern EU countries.
The insight for this finding is twofold. On the one hand, the historically lower female
labour force participation (LFP hereafter) in the olive-belt countries implies more pos-
itive selection among participating women, insofar as they have relatively high-wage
characteristics. On the other hand, since male LFP happens to be uniformly high
everywhere (implying no concerns about selectivity issues among men) and female
LFP is high in northern-central Europe, observed medians of male and female wage
distributions accurately represent their population counterparts in those countries.
Hence, without correcting for selection biases, RG in the later group of countries
would seemingly appear to be much lower than in the former group of countries.
Yet, these observed gaps would not provide good predictors of the potential gender
2
Figure 2: Labour market attachment by gender, 2007-2012.
(a) LFP changes by gender
AUT
BEL
DNKGRC
ESP
FIN
FRA
IRL
ITA
NET
NOR
PRT
UK
-
5
0
5
10
Fe
m
al
e 
LF
P 
R
at
e 
Ch
an
ge
 (p
p.)
-5 0 5 10
Male LFP Rate Change (pp.)
Observed Change
45 degree line
Source: EU-SILC and authors' calculations
(b) Employment changes by gender
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gaps (PG hereafter) were all women to participate in countries with lower female LFP.
In view of these considerations, our goal here is to contribute to this strand of the
literature by exploring whether the aforementioned diagnosis on selection might have
changed as a result of the slump. In particular, we conjecture that selection issues may
have become more relevant among men and less so among women.3 Moreover, these
changes in selection are more likely to have taken place in the peripheral countries
than in the rest of the EU. One plausible explanation of this changing nature of selec-
tion by gender is that the crisis has led to a much more intensive shedding of male
unskilled jobs, either in construction (Ireland, Spain), services (Greece or Italy) or in
public- sector employment (Portugal), than in other economies less badly hit by the
global downturn.
Following a massive job shedding among the less- or middle-skilled workers, the
distribution of observed male wages is bound to have become a censored (to the
left) version of the imputed distribution. On the contrary, perhaps as a result of
an ”added-worker” effect, female LFP may have increased to help restore household
income in those countries where male breadwinners have become unemployed. Com-
bining both effects would lead to a lower gap between observed and potential female
wages during the GR than prior to it.
As shown in Figure 2a, where changes in female LFP rates (in pp., vertical axis)
3To our knowledge, Arellano and Bonhomme (2015) is the only paper that documents positive male
selection into the labour market. Their focus is on the UK prior to the GR.
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during the GR are plotted against changes in male LFP rates (in pp., horizontal axis),
most European countries (albeit Finland) have exhibited a much larger rise in female
LFP since 2007 than before, in line with the aforementioned added-worker hypoth-
esis. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that higher LFP by women does not
necessarily translate into female employment gains. In effect, according to Figure
2b, where changes in female employment rates (in pp.,vertical axis) are displayed
against the corresponding changes in male employment rates (in pp., horizontal axis),
both are negative in almost half of the countries under consideration.4 For example,
Greece, Portugal and Spain (together with Ireland) exhibit much larger drops in male
than in female employment (points above the 45o line), capturing large job destruc-
tion in male-intensive industries. However, even within the peripheral countries,
there are different experiences. For instance, employment changes in Italy have been
much more muted than in the other southern EU countries. Northern and central EU
countries in turn have followed rather different employment patterns, experiencing
much lower male and female job losses.
When employment changes are analysed distinguishing by educational attain-
ment (for males in Figures 4a and 3a and for females in Figures 4b and 3b) it becomes
noticeable that the fall in employment has been more pronounced for less-educated
male workers. This is especially the case in Ireland and Spain, as a result of the burst-
ing of their respective housing bubbles. Likewise, as regards LFP, Figure 3b reveals
that most of the gains in participation in the peripheral countries are due to females
with no college education. In addition, when distinguishing by civil status of women,
Figures 5a and 5b show that in most instances increases in LFP and employment rates
have been much larger for married than for single women, therefore yielding support
to the added-worker hypothesis.
Our paper contributes to a vast literature on gender outcomes in developed and
developing countries; cf. Blau et al. (2013) and Goldin (2014) for comprehensive
overviews. While most of the literature document historical trends, our paper com-
plements this approach by providing evidence on how sizeable changes in gender
pay gaps are shaped at particularly relevant business cycle phases, as is the case
of the GR. As in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008), our empirical approach relies on
comparing RG based on observed wages with PG based on imputed wages for the
nonemployed, in order to derive selection biases. Combining this evidence with LFP
and employment gaps (aggregate and by skill and age), we are able to analyze how
changes in selection biases, either on their own or combined with some of the pre-
vious hypotheses, are able to shed more light on the interpretation of the changing
4Employment rates are the ratios between employment and the labour force.
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Figure 3: Cross-country changes in LFP by gender and skill, 2007-2012.
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(b) Females
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Figure 4: Cross-country changes in employment rates by gender and skill, 2007-2012.
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(b) Females
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patterns in gender pay gaps experienced in Europe over the GR.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 lines up the main argu-
ments in the paper by focussing on two illustrative cases of the different patterns
found in the paper: Portugal and Spain. Section 3 provides a theoretical underpin-
ning of the main mechanisms at play and derives their testable implications in terms
of changes in selection biases and employment by gender. Section 4 describes the EU-
5
Figure 5: Cross-country changes in female employment and LFP by marital status,
2007-2012.
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(b) Employment
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SILC longitudinal dataset used throughout the paper. Section 5 explains the different
imputation procedures we use to construct potential wage distributions. Section 6
discusses the main results in the light of the implications of the various mechanisms
explored earlier. Finally, Section 7 concludes. An Appendix provides further details
on the construction of hourly wages, measures of goodness of alternative imputa-
tion procedures and further descriptive statistics for the 13 European countries in our
sample.
2 Illustrative Example: Portugal and Spain
To illustrate the different phenomena sketched above, let us focus on Portugal and
Spain (the Iberian peninsula) as two interesting case studies of how changes in the
labour market over the GR have affected selection by gender. As can be observed
in Figure 2a, female participation (LFP) has experienced a strong increase in both
countries. Moreover, Figure 3b shows that this rise in has been especially strong
among less-skilled women in Spain (an increase of almost 13 pp. against 9 pp. in
Portugal). By contrast, Figures 3a and 3b show that LFP among high-skilled (college)
women, and among men with either skills have hardly changed. Yet, when looking
at employment changes by education levels, important differences emerge: female
employment among the less-skilled has dropped much more in Spain (about 7 pp.)
than in Portugal (about 1 pp.), and a similar pattern holds for high-skilled men and
6
Figure 6: Selection bias and employment rates by gender, Portugal, 2007-2012.
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women.
Summing up, the stylized facts presented above for these two neighbouring coun-
tries indicate that, while less-skilled male workers suffered massive job losses, non-
participating less-educated women increasingly searched for jobs. This is seemingly
consistent with the argument given above on how the GR could have impinged on
the nature of gender selection into the labour market. However, in parallel with a rise
in labour supply, it is well known that many unskilled jobs were destroyed during the
slump, the more so in Spain. This implies that, while only adverse labour demand
shifts (i.e., higher job destruction) apply to males, both labour demand and labour
supply considerations are likely to have been relevant for women.
Turning to the selection process, the left-hand-side (LHS) panel in Figure 6a
presents the selection biases for males and females in Portugal from 2007 to 2012,
computed according to one of the imputation methods advocated by Olivetti and
Petrongolo (2008).5 Selection biases are measured as a percentage decrease in the
median wage once wages of those nonemployed are imputed. The RHS panel in turn
displays the employment rates (shares of occupied in the population of working age)
for this country. As can be inspected, male selection (dashed line) in Portugal in-
creases drastically during the GR, whilst female selection declines. Notice that both
features are in line with the big drop in male employment rate and the small increase
in the female LFP rate depicted in the RHS panel. Figures 7a and 7b display similar
5This imputation procedure and alternative ones are described further below in Section 5.
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Figure 7: Selection bias and employment rates by gender, Spain, 2007-2012.
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information for Spain. As in Portugal, male selection surges during the GR but, in
contrast to Portugal, female selection in Spain went up rather drastically instead of
going down.
The contrasting behaviour between these two countries is probably due to the
fact that, while both female and male employment rates collapsed in Spain, only
male employment declined in Portugal. The explanation for the better performance
of the Portuguese labour market is likely to be related to its larger wage flexibility
prior to 2012, as well as to their less dualized labour market (see Dolado (2016)).
At any rate, given that employment adjustment in Spain was mainly borne by the
termination of temporary contracts (where women are over-represented) what this
evidence seemingly shows is that an increase in female LFP (a positive labour supply
shift) has been offset by an even larger reduction in female employment (a negative
labour demand shift). In other words, the number of less-skilled female workers who
lost their jobs was larger than the corresponding number of new female entrants in
the Spanish labour market, implying an adverse net effect on female jobs on top of the
decline in male jobs. Thus, since it is likely that those women who retained their jobs
were favourably selected, an increasing, rather than decreasing, selection bias arises.
As will be discussed further below in Section 6, similar patterns hold in Greece, a
country whose cumulated collapse in GDP of more than 25% during the GR meant
even more dramatic employment losses than in Spain. Finally, as a counterexample
of these dramatic changes, evidence will also be provided showing that changes in
8
selection patterns by gender are much less pronounced in other northern and central
EU countries, where employment changes over this period have been much more
muted than in the peripheral economies.
3 A Simple Theoretical Framework
To provide some theoretical underpinning of the mechanisms at play, our departure
point is the following log. potential wage equation as in Mulligan and Rubinstein
(2008)
wit = µwt + giγt + εit (1)
where wit denotes individual i’s potential log wage in year t, gi represents gender
(males have g = 0, females have g = 1), µwt represents the determinants of wages that
are common to all workers, while γt captures those determinants of female wages
common to all women but not applicable to men (including discriminatory practices
by employers). In addition, εit is an error term normalized to have a unit variance
(for both males and females) such that m(εit/µwt , gi) = 0, where m(·) denotes the
(conditional) median function.
If we were able to measure potential wages for all men and women, then potential
(median) gender gap at year t (PGt) would be:
PGt ≡ m(wit|gi = 0)−m(wit|gi = 1) = −γt. (2)
where we expect PGt > 0, since γt < 0 on historical grounds (see Olivetti and Petron-
golo (2016)).6
However, given that selection into employment is not a random outcome of the
male and female populations, the observed raw gender gap in median (RGt) is calcu-
lated by aggregating equation (1) by gender among employed individuals:7
RGt ≡ m(wit|gi = 0, Lit = 1)−m(wit|gi = 1, Lit = 1)
= −γt + m(εit|gi = 1, Lit = 1)−m(εit|gi = 0, Lit = 1)
= PGt + bmt − b ft︸ ︷︷ ︸
selection bias differential
(3)
6Consistently with the empirical section, our focus is on median rather than mean gender gaps.
The choice is without loss of generality: the results can be rewritten in terms of mean gaps and biases.
In such case, selection bias becomes a function of the inverse Mill’s ratio, similarly to Mulligan and
Rubinstein (2008).
7The discussion below echoes the well-known arguments on selection biases in the seminal work
by Gronau (1974) and Heckman (1974), albeit based on gaps in median wages rather than on average
wages as these authors do.
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where Lit is an indicator for whether individual i is employed in year t, and bmt =
m(εit|gi = 0, Lit = 1) and b ft = m(εit|gi = 1, Lit = 1) are the (median) selection biases
of males and females, respectively, which differ from zero to the extent that non-
employed males and females have different potential wages than employed ones. As
discussed above, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) argue that in northern EU countries
bmt ' b ft and therefore RGt ' PGt, whereas in southern EU countries bmt < b ft , and
thus RGt < PGt.
Using (3), the change in the observed gender gap over time can be expressed as:
∆RGt = ∆PGt + ∆bmt − ∆b ft . (4)
Equation (4) has three terms. The first one (∆PGt = −∆γt) is the change in the
gender-specific component of net labor demand, which may occur due to changes
in gender wage discrimination / relative market valuation of skills / relative human
capital accumulation when considering all men and women. In addition, the second
and third terms in (4) capture the changes in the selection bias of males and females,
respectively, which constitute our main focus in the sequel.8
3.1 Scenarios over the GR
To identify which of the arguments laid out above (hinging on selection or not) are
more likely to hold in different areas of Europe, we propose the following three
hypotheses (individually or jointly) and derive their main testable implications:
• Hypothesis I: Reduction in bonuses and performance pay.
As argued by Bettio et al. (2012), wages fell during the GR because of a reduction
in variable pay component. Insofar as male employees are more prone to receive
this type of compensation (see de la Rica et al. (2015)), then Hypothesis I implies
that, absent selection issues, RG should decline, while no substantial changes
in male (Em) and female (E f ) employment rates should have taken place. As a
result, (4) implies that, ∆RGt = ∆PGt < 0, due to ∆γt > 0, and ∆Em ' ∆E f ' 0.
• Hypothesis II: Higher job destruction rate of low-skilled jobs.
8Notice that, had we allowed for changes in the variance in the error term εit,an additional term
would appear in (4), namely (bmt − b ft )∆σεt , where σεt is its time-varying standard deviation . This
term captures changes in the dispersion of wages which has been shown to play an important role in
explaining female selection in the US (see Mulligan and Rubinstein, 2008). Yet, we ignore these changes
in the sequel because, as shown in Figure 8 in Appendix B, where wage dispersion is measured by
logarithm of the ratio between wages at 90th and 10th percentiles, no major trends seem to to present
over 2004-2012, with perhaps the exceptions of Greece and Portugal.
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– Hypothesis IIm: If the GR has largely resulted in the shedding of unskilled
low-paid jobs in male labour-intensive industries, then we would expect a
positive male selection bias (∆bmt > 0). Using (4), this implies that ∆RGt >
∆PGt ' 0. The employment patterns consistent with this hypothesis would
be a decline in employment of unskilled male workers, i.e. ∆Emut < 0,
and no changes in either skilled male or overall female employment, i.e.,
∆Emst = ∆E
f
t = 0 respectively.
– Hypothesis II f . Same as Hypothesis IIm except that now the focus is on
changes in female employment. It may be more pronounced in countries
with dual labour markets where temporary jobs (in which females are over-
represented) can be easily terminated at low cost. It then holds that ∆E f ut <
0.
• Hypothesis III: Higher LFP of less-skilled women as a result of the added-worker
effect.
If the GR has pushed less able women to rise their participation in the labor
market, female selection has become less positive, that is, ∆b ft < 0, and hence
∆RGt > ∆PGt ' 0. One should expect an increase in employment of unskilled
female workers, i.e. ∆E f ut > 0, without noticeable changes in female skilled and
overall male employment, that is, ∆E f st = ∆E
m
t = 0.
In practice, however, combinations of these hypotheses might be relevant. For
instance, it is plausible that Hypothesis II f and III could have operated in conjunction.
In effect, although female LFP may have risen, a decline in labour demand could have
more than offset this increase. If the latter had been strong enough, then it could lead
to a drop in E f . In particular, this could have been again the case in EU countries
with dual labour markets, where job shedding has concentrated on temporary jobs
in services sectors in which women are typically disproportionately represented.
3.2 The Model
In this section we propose a simple model that rationalizes the main implications
derived above. To do so, we extend the setup in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) by
adding to the potential market wage equation (1) a productivity equation, xit, as well
as a reservation wage equation, rit, to predict which workers are employed:
wit = µwt + giγt + εit (5)
xit = µxt + ρεit (6)
rit = giµrt , (7)
11
where µxt is the average productivity of a worker, µ
r
t is the female reservation wage
(male reservation wage is normalized to zero), εit is a productivity shock. We as-
sume that ρ > 1 to capture the fact that wages do not fully respond to productivity
shocks, εit, because they are not totally flexible. For expositional simplicity no shock
is attached in the reservation wage equation.
Individual i works at time t if her/his reservation wage is higher than her/his
potential market wage (labour supply condition), wit > rit, and her/his productivity
is greater than the wage, leaving a positive surplus for the firm (labour demand
condition), xit − wit > 0. We assume that, on average, men participate if µwt > 0,
given that the male reservation wage is set equal to zero, and that they generate a
surplus, µxt − µwt > 0, at any period t.
The labour supply (LS) condition, wit > rit, is satisfied if and only if:
aLSt (gi) < εit (8)
aLSt (gi) ≡ giµrt − µwt − giγt,
whereas the labor demand (LD) condition, wit < xit, holds if and only if:
aLDt (gi) < εit (9)
aLDt (gi) ≡
µwt + giγt − µxt
(ρ− 1) .
Both conditions yield a gender-specific lower bound for εit implying that only one
of the two constraints above binds. Because of the zero male-reservation wage, the LS
condition for men always holds, and therefore the LD condition is the only binding
one. For women, the LD condition is binding if and only if aLSt (1) < a
LD
t (1) or:
µxt − (µwt + γt)
µwt + γt − µrt
< ρ− 1. (10)
Intuitively, equation (10) holds when: (i) the potential wage is high relative to
productivity, i.e. when µxt − (µwt + γt) is low; (ii) the reservation wage is low relative
to potential wage, i.e. (µwt + γt)− µrt is high; (iii) the surplus is high, i.e. ρ is large.
By contrast, when µxt − (µwt + γt) is high, (µwt + γt) − µrt is low and ρ is close to
unity, it is likely that aLDt < a
LS
t and therefore the LS condition would be the binding
one. For example, in more traditional societies (like those in southern Europe), where
the female reservation wage is high and the surplus is low, the LS condition will
be binding. Conversely, in a more modern society (like in northern-central Europe),
where the female reservation wage is low and the surplus is high, the LD condition
is the binding one.
12
3.2.1 Male Participation
In what follows we make use of the following result concerning the median of a
(standardized) Normal distribution which is truncated from below (see Johnson et al.
(1994)). Assuming εit ∼ N [0, 1] and denoting the c.d.f. of the standardized normal
distribution by Φ(·), then the median, m(a), of the truncated from below distribution
of εit, such that a < εit, is given by:
m(a) = Φ−1
[
1
2
(1+Φ(a))
]
.
Using this result, the observed male wage, for which aLSt (g = 0) < a
LD
t (g = 0),
has a closed-form solution:
wmt ≡ m(wit|gi = 0, Lit = 1) = m(wit|gi = 0, aLDt (g = 0) < εit)
= µwt + m(a
LD
t (g = 0)).
Given the properties of Φ(·), it holds that the m (·) term is a non-negative increasing
function of aLDt (g = 0) which measures the strength of the selection bias in the
median sense, bmt = m(εit|gi = 0, Lit = 1) = m(aLDt (g = 0)).
Then, the comparative statics formula of wmt with respect to µ
x
t is given by:
dwmt
dµxt
=
∂m
∂aLDt (g = 0)
× ∂a
LD
t (g = 0)
∂µxt
< 0, (11)
since aLDt (g = 0) is decreasing in µ
x
t . Hence, if the GR has generated a drop in pro-
ductivity, ∆µxt < 0, the median of the observed male wage distribution will increase
due to a stronger positive selection of males into employment, ∆bmt > 0.
The same analytic framework could be used to model the effects of a rise in early
retirement. Because older workers have longer experience and this typically leads to
higher wages, early retirement would imply stronger negative selection, ∆bmt < 0.
3.2.2 Female Participation
Mutatis mutandis, the female wage among the employed workers is given by:
w ft ≡ m(wit|gi = 1, Lit = 1) = m(wit|gi = 1, a ft < εit)
= µwt + γt + m(a
f
t )
a ft ≡
{
aLSt (g = 1) : a
LS
t (g = 1) > a
LD
t (g = 1)
aLDt (g = 1) : a
LS
t (g = 1) < a
LD
t (g = 1)
Thus, the observed female wage will depend on which of the LS and LD con-
straints is binding. Again, the strength of the selection bias for females is measured
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by the m(·) term, that is, b ft = m(εit|gi = f , Lit = 1) = m(a ft ). If the binding constraint
is LD, aLSt (g = 1) < a
LD
t (g = 1), a reduction in labor productivity will have the same
effect on observed female wages as for male wages, namely:
dw ft
dµxt
=
∂m
∂aLDt (g = 1)
× ∂a
LD
t (g = 1)
∂µxt
< 0. (12)
As predicted by Hypothesis III when LD binds, the previous expression shows that,
like as males, observed female wages will increase due to a stronger positive selection
of women into employment when productivity goes down.
However, if the LS constraint is the binding one, aLSt (g = 1) > a
LD
t (g = 1), then:
dw ft
dµrt
=
∂m
∂aLSt
× ∂a
LS
t
∂µrt
> 0. (13)
Hence, if the GR has generated a worker-added effect among previous non partic-
ipants, this translates into a reduction in the reservation wage, ∆µrt < 0. This results
in a reduction of the observed female wage due to a less positive selection, ∆b ft < 0,
which is the main prediction of Hypothesis III when LS binds.
In sum, depending upon which of the two opposite forces (LD and LS) dominates,
the observed female wage may go up or down as a result of the GR.
4 Data
To measure both RG and PG, we use the European Statistics on Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC) data set.9 This is an unbalanced household-based panel survey
which has replaced the European Community Household Panel Survey (ECHPS) as
the standard data source for many gender gap studies in Europe, including the afore-
mentioned Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008). It collects comparable multidimensional
annual micro-data on a few thousands households per country starting from 2004
until 2012, that is, a sample period which covers years before and after the GR .
The countries in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK, and Norway.10 It is
noteworthy that some big EU countries, such as Germany are not included in our
sample due to lack of longitudinal information on several key variables affecting
wages.
9Existing literature using EU-SILC data for international comparisons of gender gaps include
Christofides et al. (2013), who use OLS and quantile regressions to document the differences in the
gender gap across the wage distribution in a number of countries.
10Note that although Norway is not an EU member state, we use this labeling for simplicity. Together
with Denmark, we use this country as a representative gender patterns in the Nordic countries.
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We restrict our sample to individuals aged 25-54 as of the survey date, and we
use self-defined labor market status to exclude those in self-employment, full-time
education, and military service.
One of the shortcomings of the EU-SILC data is that income information is only
available for the income reference period while labour market status and additional
variables are recorded at the moment of the interview during the survey year, which
for most countries do not capture the same period. In effect, the income reference pe-
riod corresponds to the previous calendar year for all countries except the UK (where
the income reference period is the current year) and Ireland, (where the income ref-
erence period is the 12 months preceding the interview). We follow a methodology
similar to Engel and Schaffner (2012) to derive hourly wages. A detailed account of
this procedure is provided in Appendix A.
The educational attainment categories used (no college and college), correspond
to ISCED 0-4 and 5-7, respectively. Spouse income is calculated as annual labor in-
come for spouses of respondents. Descriptive statistics are reported in Appendix B.
Finally, throughout our empirical analysis observations are weighted using popula-
tion weights when available.11
5 Empirical Methodology
As mentioned earlier, median wage regressions are used to estimate parameters µwt
and γt in equation (1). However, wages wit are only observed for the employed
and are missing for the rest of the sample. As shown in equation (3), running the
median wage regression on the observed wages will result in a bias to the extent that
m(εit|gi, Lit = 1) 6= 0, i.e. employed males and females have have difference potential
wage distributions than employed ones.
As discussed in Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008), the median estimator on a trans-
formed dependent variable which equals wit for those who are employed at time t,
Lit = 1, and some arbitrary low or high imputed value, wt and wt respectively, for
those in the non-employment, Lit = 0, will result in an unbiased estimator of the
median gap in potential wages as long as the missing wage observations are imputed
on the right side of the median. To understand this procedure, let us consider the
following illustrative linear wage equation:
ω = β0 + β1g + e, (14)
11Specifically, we use personal base weights, PB050. For Denmark, Finland, Sweden and The Nether-
lands income data is only available for selected respondents. We use personal base weights for selected
respondents, PB080, for these countries. Personal weights are not available for Norway and Ireland.
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where ω is the (logged) potential wage of an (atomistic) agent in a very large (contin-
uous) sample of individuals, β0 is an intercept, β1 is the parameter capturing the pay
gap, gi is a gender dummy, and ei is a disturbance term with support (-∞,+∞) and
c.d.f. F(·), such that m(e|g) = 0. Let β̂ = (β̂0, β̂1)′ be the hypothetical least absolute
deviations (LAD) regression estimators based on potential wages, namely, β̂ ≡ arg
min
∫
∞−∞|ω − β0 − β1g|dF(e). Suppose now that wages are only observed for the
employed, while the missing wages for the nonemployed fall completely below the
median regression line, i.e., ω < ω̂ ≡ β̂0 + β̂1g, that is, F(m|g, L = 0) = 1.12 Then,
defining a transformed dependent variable y such that it equals the observed wage wi
for L = 1 and an arbitrarily low value w (with w < ω̂) for L = 0, the LAD estimator
of of the median of y, denoted as ŷ, verifies:13
ŷ = arg min
ŷ
[
∫ w
−∞
|w− ω̂|dF(e) +
∫ ŷ
w
|w− ω̂|dF(ei) +
∫ ∞
ŷ
|w− ω̂|dF(e)].
Using Leibniz’s rule to differentiate this object function w.r.t. ŷ yields the following
f.o.c:
[F(w) + F(ŷ)− F(w)]− 0.5[1− F(ŷ)] = 0,
that is, F(ŷ) = 0.5, whereas the f.o.c. for the LAD estimator of the median of potential
wages verifies F(ω̂) = 0.5. Hence, it follows that ŷ = ω̂.
In the sequel we use this procedure and compute median gender gaps as well as
the effects of selection into non-employment, based on wage imputations that require
only assumptions on the position of the imputed wage with respect to the median of
the gender-specific wage distribution.14
5.1 Imputation on Observables
We use a small number of observable characteristics, Xi, to make assumptions about
the position of the imputed wage with respect to the median of the gender-specific
wage distribution. We define a threshold for Xi below which nonemployed workers
would earn wages below the gender-specific median, and another threshold above
which individuals would earn above-median wages.
Specifically, our first specification is based on standard human capital theory and
uses observed educational attainment and labour market experience (labelled in short
12Similar arguments as below would apply if all the missing observations happen to be above the
median regression lines, with y being defined as w when L = 0.
13See Bloomfield and Steiger (2012)
14Their approach is closely related to Johnson et al. (2000) and Neal (2004).
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as Imputation on EE) to predict the position of the missing wages. In this case, as
explained earlier, the imputed dependent variable is set to equal a low value, wt, if an
individual has little education and little labour market experience and a high value,
wt, if an individual is highly educated and has a significant amount of labour market
experience. In addition, to also take into account nonemployed individuals with low
(high) education and long (short) experience, we follow Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008)
in fitting a probit model for the probability that the wage of employed individual is
above the gender specific median, based on education, experience and its square, to
obtain predicted probabilities for the nonemployed. An imputed sample using all
individuals in the sample is then constructed using these predicted probabilities as
sample weights. The reference wage is calculated on the base sample with wage
observations from adjacent waves.
As regards our second specification, we exploit the hypothesis of assortative mat-
ing which implies a positive correlation between spousal incomes within the household
(denoted in short as Imputation on SI). Further details on the precise rules of impu-
tation we use are provided further below in Section 5.
These methods of imputation of missing wages follow an educated guess. Two
procedures are used to assess the goodness of alternative guesses. The first one
(Goodness Method 1) follows Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) and uses wage infor-
mation for non-employed individuals from other waves in the panel when such in-
dividuals report receiving a wage. In this way, it is possible to check whether the
relative position as regard the median of imputed wages using information of the
aforementioned demographics corresponds to the actual one when the wage is ob-
served. Notice that this procedure is accurate to the extent that the wage position
with respect to the median when an individual is not employed can be proxied by
the observed wage in the nearest wave. The second method (Goodness Method 2)
takes all employed workers and computes the proportion of those with the relevant
personal characteristics and wage observations on the correct side of the median as
predicted by the imputation rule.
5.2 Imputation on Wages from Other Waves
As an alternative imputation method which does not rely on using arbitrary assump-
tions based on observable characteristics, as above, we exploit the panel nature of
our data so that, for all those not employed in year t, we recover their wages from
the nearest wave, t′. As argued by Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008), the identifying
assumption is that the wage position with respect to the median when an individual
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is not employed, can be proxied by the observed wage in the nearest wave.
While this procedure (denoted as Imputation on WOW) relies exclusively on
wages and therefore has the advantage of incorporating selection on time-invariant
unobservables, it has the disadvantage of not providing any wage information on
individuals who never worked during the sample period. Thus, this method will
be relatively conservative in assessing the effects of positive selection in the countries
with relatively low labour market attachment of females (like e.g. in Austria, Belgium
or the peripheral countries). In addition, there are no simple ways of assessing the
accuracy of such imputations.
Another caveat is that the panel dimension of our data set is relatively short. The
longitudinal component of EU-SILC allows to follow each household for four years.15
Proportions of imputed wage observation over the total non-employed population
are reported in Table 8: the imputation rates are generally lower than in Olivetti and
Petrongolo (2008) who benefit from a much longer panel . Also, the male imputation
rate is almost 50% higher than the female one in southern Europe. As mentioned
earlier, one way to increase these imputation rates is to estimate probabilistic models
based on observables, like education and experience, which we will use as robustness
checks for the results obtained from the more standard imputation methods.
6 Results
6.1 Imputation on employment and experience
Table 1 presents our core Imputation EE method based on education and experi-
ence. As discussed earlier, two education categories are defined: those with upper
secondary education or less are considered low-education and those with some ter-
tiary education are defined as high-education. Similarly, we define as low (high)
experience individuals with less than (at least) 15 years of work experience. We then
proceed to impute a wage below the median for those with low education and low
experience and above the median for those with high education and high experience.
The upper panel of Table 2 presents results for the four southern EU economies,
while the lower panel gives those for the rest of countries in our sample (denoted as
Rest of Europe in the sequel). We report both RG and PG in levels, selection biases
and employment rates by gender in 2007, at the onset of the GR, and the correspond-
ing change between 2007 and 2012. In line with the results of Olivetti and Petrongolo
(2008), southern EU countries exhibit a greater employment gap and a much stronger
15With the exception of France, where each household is followed for 8 consecutive years.
18
Table 1: Median Wage Gaps under Imputation on Education and Experience
Levels in 2007 Changes over 2007-2012
Raw Potential Selection Employment Raw Potential Selection Employment
Wage Wage Bias Rate Wage Wage Bias Rate
Gap Gap M F M F Gap Gap M F M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .182 .450 .016 .283 .853 .542 -.076 -.036 .069 .109 -.257 -.111
Italy .035 .266 .029 .260 .849 .558 .053 .017 .008 -.028 -.057 .002
Spain .132 .254 .012 .134 .889 .674 -.027 -.021 .087 .094 -.167 -.078
Portugal .172 .229 .030 .087 .838 .708 -.038 -.067 .011 -.018 -.084 -.014
Mean .130 .300 .022 .191 .857 .620 -.022 -.027 .044 .039 -.141 -.050
Rest of Europe:
Austria .192 .299 .009 .117 .879 .711 .012 -.021 .000 -.033 .003 .011
Belgium .074 .142 .021 .089 .866 .742 -.019 -.063 .004 -.040 -.034 .031
Ireland .170 .296 .029 .155 .851 .668 -.040 -.064 .002 -.022 -.139 -.076
United Kingdom .247 .302 .009 .063 .942 .806 -.065 -.049 .010 .026 -.035 -.025
Netherlands .158 .190 .003 .034 .933 .802 -.054 -.043 -.001 .010 -.031 -.018
France .114 .159 .006 .051 .917 .816 .005 -.015 .008 -.012 -.034 .000
Finland .203 .209 .013 .019 .897 .864 -.072 -.072 .003 .003 -.020 -.038
Denmark .116 .121 .001 .006 .985 .941 -.072 -.064 -.001 .007 -.126 -.045
Norway .154 .161 .002 .009 .975 .913 .027 .014 -.003 -.016 -.015 .004
Mean .158 .209 .010 .060 .916 .807 -.031 -.042 .003 -.008 -.048 -.017
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: Selection bias = an increase in observed wage due to selection. Wage
imputation rule: Impute wage < median when nonemployed and education ≤ upper secondary and experience < 15 years;
impute wage > median when nonemployed and education ≥ higher education and experience ≥ 15 years.
female bias than the Rest of Europe. For example, the average female bias in the
former group of countries amounts to 19 pp. out of the 30 pp. yielded by PG (i.e.,
60%), whereas it amounts to only 6.0 pp. out of 21 pp. (i.e., 27%) in the latter. In
general, female selection biases are fairly small in Rest of Europe counties (bottom
panel). The exceptions are Belgium, Austria and, particularly, Ireland, having all of
them the lowest female employment rates (between 65% and 75%) among Rest of Eu-
rope countries. In spite of having similar selections biases on average (2.2 pp. against
1.0 pp.), male biases are also higher in southern countries, a finding which is again
compatible with the lower aggregate employment rates in this group of countries.
As regards changing patterns in selection biases since 2007, two findings are note-
worthy. The first one is that the female selection bias has increased on average by 3.9
pp. in southern Europe while it has hardly moved in Rest of Europe (-0.8 pp.). How-
ever, patterns among southern countries differ in interesting ways. On the one hand,
female selection biases experience substantial reductions in Italy and Portugal, where
the fall in female employment is small or non-existent. Given the strong reduction in
male employment rates (-5.7 pp. and -8.4pp.), this finding is not only consistent with
the added-worker hypothesis but also is clearly indicative that increases in female
LFP in these two countries have been matched by similar increases in female labour
demand. Conversely, female employment has fallen sharply in Greece and Spain (and
also in Ireland), implying that a downward shift in male and female labour demand
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is the dominant force in these countries. Hence both selection biases become stronger
(more positive).
As reported in the Appendix (see Table 10 in Appendix B), female LFP rates have
increased in the four olive-belt countries and, in general, these changes have been
stronger among low-educated workers. It is worth noticing, however, that the largest
drops in female selection in our sample of countries have taken place in Austria and
Belgium (bottom panel), which are the two central EU countries where female em-
ployment rates have risen the most. In the case of Belgium, the increase in female
employment is associated with an equally large decline in male employment which
has affected both high- and low-educated women. In Austria, we find evidence of
an added-worker effect too, which in this case may reflect assortative matching in
couples. For example, Table 9 in the Appendix indicates that, while college edu-
cated Austrian males (females) experienced an increase (no change) in employment,
employment rates among low-educated individuals moved in opposite directions,
falling for men and rising for women.
Table 1 also indicates that male selection bias has increased on average by much
more in southern Europe (4.4 pp.) than in Rest of Europe (+0.3 pp.). Among the
Mediterranean economies, the rise in male selection is largest in Greece and Spain
(in line with large drops in less-skilled male employment of 27.6 pp. and 19.2 pp.,
respectively), whereas in Portugal, wage flexibility imposed by the memorandum of
understanding with the ’Troika’ and out-migration have reduced job shedding of less-
skilled men. Note that amongst the Rest of Europe, only the UK exhibits a sizeable
increase (see Arellano and Bonhomme (2015)).
When we focus on changes in pay gaps over the GR, it is found that RG has fallen
by 2.2 pp. and 3.1 pp. in Southern Europe and Rest of Europe, respectively, and that
accounting for selection accentuates the decline by about 0.5 pp. and 1 pp., respec-
tively. Note, however, that while northern-central countries share similar patterns
in RG, there are substantial variations among southern countries. For example, as
discussed in Section 2, accounting in Portugal for selection implies a much larger
reduction of PG than in RG, namely, 7.6 pp. vs. 3.8 pp, since selection has become
more positive for men and less positive for women. Similar but weaker results also
hold for Italy. Hence, Italy and Portugal are good examples of labour markets where
the binding constraint is LS. Conversely, accounting for selection makes no difference
for the changing patterns of RG and PG in Greece and Spain, since selection bias
has increased in similar ways for both genders due to adverse labour demand shifts.
These have not only meant big job losses for men, but also have offset the rise in fe-
male labour supply. Thus, these two countries provide the best illustrations of labour
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markets where the binding constraints is LD.
Table 2: Rate and Goodness of Imputation on Education and Experience
2007 2012
Imputation Goodness Goodness Imputation Goodness Goodness
Rate Method 1 Method 2 Rate Method 1 Method 2
M F M F M F M F M F M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .43 .71 .93 .86 .84 .85 .45 .63 .72 .80 .83 .82
Italy .54 .74 .81 .74 .70 .69 .51 .70 .85 .75 .72 .74
Spain .41 .66 .79 .71 .75 .80 .73 .73 .70 .69 .73 .77
Portugal .39 .54 .63 .56 .71 .77 .29 .40 .68 .60 .74 .80
Mean .44 .66 .79 .72 .75 .78 .50 .61 .74 .71 .76 .78
Rest of Europe:
Austria .34 .57 .89 .70 .76 .80 .33 .54 .80 .70 .83 .80
Belgium .39 .58 .81 .88 .79 .80 .47 .64 .82 .78 .77 .81
Ireland .41 .54 .92 .87 .83 .81 .40 .45 .73 .65 .73 .78
United Kingdom .42 .50 .36 .62 .74 .74 .41 .55 .94 .61 .76 .70
Netherlands .39 .64 .55 .94 .81 .75 .50 .59 .92 .91 .82 .77
France .44 .64 .85 .79 .80 .79 .44 .70 .68 .67 .79 .80
Finland .58 .47 .95 .85 .76 .78 .54 .45 .74 .70 .78 .73
Denmark .21 .43 .63 .75 .66 .76 .23 .57 .13 1.00 .72 .77
Norway .40 .40 .79 .71 .75 .80 .33 .45 .70 .69 .73 .77
Mean .40 .53 .75 .79 .77 .78 .41 .55 .72 .75 .77 .77
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: Wage imputation rule: Impute wage < median when
nonemployed and education ≤ upper secondary and experience < 15 years; impute wage > median
when nonemployed and education ≥ higher education and experience ≥ 15 years. Imputation Rate =
proportion of imputed wage observations in total nonemployment. Goodness Method 1 = proportion
of imputed wage observations on the same side of the median as wage observations from other waves
in the panel. Goodness Method 2 = proportion of employed workers on the same side of the median as
predicted by the imputation rule.
Table 2 reports results on our two measures of goodness of fit for the years 2007
and 2012. We report both the imputation rates for each year and the share of imputa-
tions that place the individual on the correct side of the median. Recall that Method
1 compares our imputation with the positioning implied by looking at the wage ob-
served for the individual in other waves, while Method 2 computes the proportion
of employed workers which are on the same side of the median as would be implied
if we applied our imputation rule to them. All measures are computed for men and
women separately. As expected, imputation rates are higher for women (between
40% and 74%) than for men (between 21% and 73%) and somewhat larger in south-
ern countries than in Rest of Europe. Both measures indicate a satisfactory goodness
of fit for about 75% of the individuals of either gender in our sample. Furthermore,
there is no indication that we do a better job in imputing female missing wages than
males.
Table 6 in Appendix B reports estimates based on a probit model. The imputation
technique proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate a probit model for the proba-
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bility of earning a wage below the gender-specific median, controlling for education
dummies, experience, and its square. The estimated probabilities, Pˆi, are then used
as sampling weights to impute the wages of the nonemployed individuals. Specif-
ically, each nonemployed individual appears twice in the imputed sample: with a
wage above the median and a weight Pˆi, and with a wage below the median and a
weight 1− Pˆi. To account for a bias in the reference median wage in the first step, we
enlarge our base sample with wage observations from other waves. The results are
qualitatively similar to our findings in Table 1.16
6.2 Imputation on spousal income
Table 3: Median Wage Gaps under Imputation on Spousal Income
Levels in 2007 Changes over 2007-2012
Raw Potential Selection Raw Potential Selection
Wage Wage Bias Wage Wage Bias
Gap Gap M F Gap Gap M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .182 .321 .016 .154 -.076 -.039 .049 .086
Italy .035 .107 .013 .085 .053 .032 .011 -.010
Spain .132 .179 .007 .054 -.027 -.057 .033 .003
Portugal .172 .205 .026 .059 -.038 -.073 .021 -.014
Mean .130 .203 .015 .088 -.022 -.034 .028 .016
Rest of Europe:
Austria .192 .221 .012 .041 .012 .013 -.001 .000
Belgium .074 .093 .013 .032 -.019 -.036 .004 -.013
Ireland .170 .235 .031 .096 -.040 -.071 .074 .044
United Kingdom .247 .268 .014 .035 -.065 -.052 .009 .023
Netherlands .158 .151 .003 -.003 -.054 -.052 .005 .006
France .114 .127 .004 .018 .005 -.007 .003 -.009
Finland .203 .202 .004 .003 -.072 -.062 .003 .013
Denmark .116 .115 .001 .000 -.072 -.071 .006 .007
Norway .154 .155 .000 .001 .027 .025 .007 .005
Mean .158 .174 .009 .025 -.031 -.035 .012 .008
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: Selection bias = an increase in observed
wage due to selection. Wage imputation rule: Impute wage < median when nonemployed
and spouse income in bottom quartile; impute wage > median when nonemployed and
spouse income in top quartile.
As mentioned above, under the assumption of assortative matching in marriages,
spousal income could become a good proxy for an individual’s earning capacity.
Hence, we impute a wage below (above) the median to those who are non-employed
and whose spouses have earnings that are in the bottom (top) quartile of the gender
and year specific earnings distribution. Table 3 presents the results of this imputation
16The conclusions from a probabilistic model are robust to a more general specification that includes
marital status, the number of children, and the position of spouse income in their gender-specific
distribution.
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method. The main findings of Imputation on SI echo those based on Imputation on
EE, although they tend to be less strong, probably due to a weaker performance of
Imputation SI in terms of goodness of fit.17 As before, in 2007 we observe a larger
selection in southern EU countries than in Rest of Europe, and that this selection
is particularly strong for women. The changes that have occurred during the GR
are similar across the four peripheral economies with some differences: male selec-
tion has increased in all of them; female selection has increased in Greece and, very
slightly, in Spain, while it has declined in Italy and Portugal. For the Rest of Europe,
we find again little change in female selection, while the average increase in male
selection is 1.2 pp., mainly driven by its large rise in Ireland.
6.3 Imputation on wages from other waves
Our third imputation method attributes to non-employed individuals who are ob-
served as having been employed in other waves of the panel their wage in the nearest
year for which it is available. Unfortunately, the panel dimension of our data is rather
short and we have only a limited number of available observations to impute.18 Low
imputation rates imply that a lower gap is found between the southern countries and
the Rest of Europe as regard female selection in 2007. Changes in changes selection
biases since the onset of the GR are smaller than those obtained under the previous
imputation methods. This is especially the case for female selection, except in Greece.
This smaller variation is not surprising since, e.g., in Spain the imputation rates for
2007 and 2012 are 23% and 30%, while they were 66% and 73% with Imputation EE.
Yet, as with the other imputation methods, we still document a sizeable increase in
male selection in southern countries, making this finding a rather robust one.
6.4 Interpreting the findings
In view of the previous evidence on the plausibility of our alternative imputation
methods, it seems that Imputation on EE is the procedure that provides better good-
ness of fit. Furthermore, the qualitative results from this imputation method remain
fairly robust under the other two alternative procedures. Although in principle we
could expect imputation based on wages from other waves to be more precise, the
nature of our data makes is de facto a poorer approach, as we have few observations
per individual and the nature of the GR implies that they stay out of work and hence
17Table 7 in Appendix B indicates both a lower imputation rate and worse goodness of fit.
18As can be seen from table 7 in Appendix B, we impute around a third of observations and, par-
ticularly, few women in Southern Europe. These figures are much lower than those in Olivetti and
Petrongolo (2008), who have a longer panel.
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Table 4: Median Wage Gaps under Imputation Based on Wages from Other Waves
Levels in 2007 Changes over 2007-2012
Raw Potential Selection Raw Potential Selection
Wage Wage Bias Wage Wage Bias
Gap Gap M F Gap Gap M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .182 .191 .010 .019 -.076 -.086 .018 .008
Italy .035 .046 .008 .019 .053 .048 .011 .006
Spain .132 .152 .003 .023 -.027 -.049 .024 .002
Portugal .172 .173 .006 .008 -.038 -.049 .015 .004
Mean .130 .141 .007 .017 -.022 -.034 .017 .005
Rest of Europe:
Austria .192 .211 .003 .023 .012 .003 .007 -.002
Belgium .074 .078 .006 .010 -.019 -.026 .004 -.003
Ireland .170 .184 .012 .026 -.040 -.055 .000 -.014
United Kingdom .247 .253 .000 .006 -.065 -.080 .006 -.008
Netherlands .158 .160 .005 .007 -.054 -.050 .002 .006
France .114 .126 .004 .016 .005 -.007 .001 -.011
Finland .203 .199 .011 .008 -.072 -.066 -.005 .002
Denmark .116 .117 .001 .003 -.072 -.074 -.001 -.003
Norway .154 .160 .002 .009 .027 .023 .003 -.001
Mean .158 .165 .005 .012 -.031 -.037 .002 -.004
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: Selection bias = an increase in observed
wage due to selection. Wage imputation rule: Impute wage from other waves when nonem-
ployed.
have no observable wages for various years. Thus, in the sequel, we will concentrate
on summarizing the main findings drawn from the results in Table 1.
Comparing this evidence with the theoretical scenarios laid oud in section 3.1 on
the different implications of the main drivers of gender pay gaps over the crisis, the
following findings stand out. They are summarized in Table 5.
• Hypothesis I on its own (a similar reduction in RG and PG, due to a drop
in performance pay affecting men, without major changes in employment and
selection of either gender) does not seem to hold in the majority of countries.
This is because, though there are similar drops in observed and potential gaps
in several instances (Spain, among southern countries, and Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, The Netherlands and the UK, among Rest of Europe), either sizeable
changes in selection biases or in employment rates have also taken place.
• As regards Hypothesis II, no country in our sample satisfies the predictions of
Hypothesis IIm on its own (only male selection increases). The reason is that,
although male selection has become increasingly positive in most countries,
female selection changes have often been even larger, especially in southern Eu-
rope. By the same token, given the non-negligible changes in male selection, it
also follows that no country satisfies the corresponding predictions of Hypoth-
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Table 5: Summary of Findings over the Great Recession
Consistent Hypotheses
Southern Europe:
Greece I + IIm + II f
Italy IIm + III
Spain I + IIm + II f
Portugal I + IIm + III
Rest of Europe:
Austria III
Belgium I + IIm + III
Ireland I + IIm + III
United Kingdom I + IIm + II f
Netherlands I + IIm + II f
France I + IIm + III
Finland I + IIm + II f
Denmark I + IIm + II f
Norway IIm + III
esis II f on its own (only female selection increases).
• Hypothesis III (decline in female selection bias as a result of an added-worker
effect, and no change in male selection, with large employment gains for women
and no major changes for men’s), seems to hold in Austria, while it is only
partially verified by Italy in the first group, and Belgium, Ireland, Norway and
The Netherlands in the second group. Notice that in all these countries, despite
fulfilling the predicted changes in selection by gender, there are sizeable drops
in male employment.
From the previous discussion, one can infer that the observed selection and em-
ployment changes could be rationalized by combining some of the individual hy-
potheses.
• Among southern EU countries, Portugal becomes the best example of the com-
bination of Hypotheses I+IIm+III, which jointly lead to a reduction in both PG
and PG, a decline (increase) in female (male) selection, a large drop in male
employment (especially unskilled) and a rise in female employment. Italy ex-
hibits somewhat similar patterns, except that RG, and to a lesser extent PG, have
shot up. This could rationalized by a combination of Hypotheses IIm+II f . By
contrast, the Greek and Spanish patterns seem to be better explained by Hy-
potheses I+IIm+II f , with an increase in both male and female selection biases
and a collapse in both (unskilled) male and female employment rates.
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• Among Rest of Europe, as already mentioned, Austria provides a good illus-
tration of Hypothesis III on its own, whereas the findings for Belgium, France,
and Ireland fit with Hypotheses I+IIm+III; finally, the evidence for Denmark,
Finland, The Netherlands and the UK are better rationalized by I+IIm+II f .
Overall, our main conclusions from the previous discussion is that changing pat-
terns in male and female selection have been much more pronounced in southern
Europe than in Rest of Europe. Depending on whether LD or LS shifts dominate,
we find cases where these changes have led to a larger or smaller reduction in PG
than in RG. Yet, a fairly robust case for an increase in male selection can be made.
Furthermore, among those EU countries most badly hit by the crisis, it seems that in
those where female LFP was higher before the crisis (Ireland and Portugal), female
selection corrections have gone down, while the opposite has happened in those
where female participation was lower (Greece and Portugal)
7 Conclusions
Our goal in this paper has been to analyze whether conventional patterns of selection
of workers into EU labour market have changed as a result of the big variations in
labour demand and labour supply brought in by the Great Recession (GR). Based on
a large body of empirical evidence, it has been traditionally assumed that, because
of their high LFP rates, there were no relevant differences between the observed
and potential male wage distributions prior to the crisis. In contrast, due to their
lower LFP rates (especially in southern Europe), favourable labour market selection
has operated among women. Our working hypothesis is that, if the big job losses
brought in by the GR have mainly affected unskilled male-dominated sectors, then
male selection may have become positive. Moreover, if non-participating women have
increase their LFP due to an added-worker effect, then female selection may have
become less positive, unless adverse labour demand shifts have more than offset the
rise in female labour supply. In this case female selection changes would have been
more muted or even become more positive.
Using alternative imputation methods of wages for non-participating individuals
in EU-SILC datasets for a large group of European countries, our main findings sup-
port the conjecture that male selection corrections have become more relevant in most
instances. This has been especially the case in some southern EU economies, where
large male job losses have taken place in response to bursting of real estate bubbles,
or because dysfunctional labour markets, characterized by labour contract dualism or
wage rigidity, have incentivized adjustment to negative shocks via dismissals rather
26
than through wage cuts. Spain provides the best illustration of this changing pattern.
With regard to female selection, we find mixed results: while there are cases where,
in line with the added-worker effect, this selection has gone down significantly (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Ireland, Italy and Portugal), in other instances (Greece and Spain) it has
gone up because of widespread job destruction has prevented new female entrants
into the labour market from finding jobs.
We conjecture that, once the GR is over and employment growth picks up, it is
likely that the increase in male selection will remain relevant. This is so since those
men who lost their jobs during the crisis (mostly concentrated in construction and
other low-value added industries) are likely to become long-term unemployed and
hence non-employable. Likewise, the decrease in female selection is likely to stay.
This is so since increasing female LFP is a persistent trend at both ends of skills
distribution, in line with the job polarization phenomenon documented by Autor
and Dorn (2013) for the US and Goos et al. (2009) for some EU countries. Hence, if
these predictions hold, everything else equal, we may see increases in actual, rather
than in potential, gender pay gaps in the future.
27
References
Arellano, M. and S. Bonhomme, “Quantile selection models,” (2015).
Autor, D. and D. Dorn, “The growth of low-skill service jobs and the polarization
of the US labor market,” The American Economic Review 103 (2013), 1553–1597.
Bettio, F., M. Corsi, C. DIppoliti, A. Lyberaki, M. Lodovici and A. Verashchag-
ina, The impact of the economic crisis on the situation of women and men and on gender
equality policies (European Commission, 2012).
Blau, F. D., M. A. Ferber and A. E. Winkler, The economics of women, men, and work
(Pearson; 7 edition, 2013).
Bloomfield, P. and W. Steiger, Least absolute deviations: Theory, applications and algo-
rithms, volume 6 (Springer Science & Business Media, 2012).
Christofides, L. N., A. Polycarpou and K. Vrachimis, “Gender wage gaps, ‘sticky
floors’ and ‘glass ceilings’ in Europe,” Labour Economics 21 (2013), 86–102.
de la Rica, S., J. J. Dolado and R. Vegas, “Gender Gaps in Performance Pay: New
Evidence from Spain,” Annals of Economics and Statistics (2015), 41–59.
Dolado, J. J., “EU Dual Labour Markets: Consequences and Potential Reforms,”
in R. B. et al., ed., Economics without Borders. Economic Research for European Policy
Challenges (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
Engel, M. and S. Schaffner, “How to Use the EU-SILC Panel to Analyse Monthly
and Hourly Wages,” Ruhr Economic Paper (2012).
Goldin, C., “A grand gender convergence: Its last chapter,” The American Economic
Review 104 (2014), 1091–1119.
Goos, M., A. Manning and A. Salomons, “Job polarization in Europe,” The Ameri-
can Economic Review (2009), 58–63.
Gronau, R., “Wage Comparisons–A Selectivity Bias,” The Journal of Political Economy
(1974), 1119–1143.
Heckman, J., “Shadow Prices, Market Wages, and Labor Supply,” Econometrica 42
(1974), 679–94.
Johnson, N. L., S. Kotz and N. Balakrishnan, “Continuous univariate distribu-
tions, vol. 1-2,” (1994).
28
Johnson, W., Y. Kitamura and D. Neal, “Evaluating a simple method for estimating
black-white gaps in median wages,” American Economic Review (2000), 339–343.
Mulligan, C. B. and Y. Rubinstein, “Selection, investment, and women’s relative
wages over time,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (2008), 1061–1110.
Neal, D., “The Measured Black-White Wage Gap among Women Is Too Small,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy 112 (2004), S1–S28.
OECD, “Employment Outlook 2014,” Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (2014).
Olivetti, C. and B. Petrongolo, “Unequal pay or unequal employment? A cross-
country analysis of gender gaps,” Journal of Labor Economics 26 (2008), 621–654.
———, “The Evolution of the Gender Gap in Industrialized Countries,” Annual Re-
view of Economics 8 (2016).
29
A Deriving Hourly Wages
The main challenge in deriving hourly wages is to combine annual income (PY010)
and monthly economic status information (PL210A-PL210L up to 2009 and PL211A-
PL211L onwards) for the previous calendar year with the number of hours usually
worked per week (PL060) at the date of the interview.
To do this we combine the longitudinal files from the period 2005-2013 and use
the imputed annual hours of work
hoursannual = monthsannual × 4.345× hoursweek
to calculate hourly wages. The following set of rules are used sequentially to impute
missing annual hours of work during the previous calendar year:
1. For those workers who have only one employment spell (with no changes in full-
time/part-time status), we use the number of months of this spell and the number of hours
from the previous survey.
2. For those workers who have only one employment spell (with no changes in full-
time/part-time status), we use the number of months of this spell and the number of hours
declared at the date of the interview if the person hasn’t changed job since last year (PL160).
In the case of United Kingdom, we only use the number of hours at the date of the
interview since the income reference period coincides with the year of the interview.
3. For those workers who have only one employment spell (with no changes in full-
time/part-time status), we use the number of months of this spell and approximate the number
of hours by the year- gender- full-time/part-time status- specific mean.
4. For those workers who have multiple employment spells, we use the number of months
of each spell and the number of hours for each spell approximated by the year- gender- full-
time/part-time status- specific mean.
B Additional Tables and Figures
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Table 6: Median Wage Gaps under Imputation on Education and Experience - Prob-
abilistic Model
Levels in 2007 Changes over 2007-2012
Raw True Selection Raw True Selection
Wage Wage Bias Wage Wage Bias
Gap Gap M F Gap Gap M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .182 .413 .016 .247 -.076 -.088 .067 .056
Italy .035 .184 .014 .163 .053 .027 .013 -.013
Spain .132 .207 .010 .085 -.027 -.026 .035 .036
Portugal .172 .219 .012 .059 -.038 -.061 .016 -.007
Mean .130 .256 .013 .138 -.022 -.037 .033 .018
Rest of Europe:
Austria .192 .266 .009 .084 .012 -.016 .001 -.027
Belgium .074 .143 .021 .090 -.019 -.060 .000 -.041
Ireland .170 .273 .042 .145 -.040 -.019 .037 .059
United Kingdom .247 .262 .010 .025 -.065 -.040 .009 .035
Netherlands .158 .175 .004 .021 -.054 -.044 .003 .012
France .114 .144 .005 .035 .005 -.012 .009 -.008
Finland .203 .200 .013 .010 -.072 -.066 .002 .008
Denmark .116 .119 .000 .003 -.072 -.073 .007 .006
Norway .154 .156 .002 .004 .027 .023 .004 .000
Mean .158 .193 .012 .046 -.031 -.034 .008 .005
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: Selection bias = an increase in
observed wage due to selection. Wage imputation rule: Impute wage <(>) median
with probability Pˆi (respectively, 1− Pˆi) if nonemployed, where Pˆi is the predicted
probability of earning a wage below the gender-specific median, as estimated from
a probit model including education dummies, experience and its square on an
enlarged base sample with wage observations from other waves.
Table 7: Rate and Goodness of Imputation on Spousal Income
2007 2012
Imputation Goodness Goodness Imputation Goodness Goodness
Rate Method 1 Method 2 Rate Method 1 Method 2
M F M F M F M F M F M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .27 .63 .56 .29 .55 .61 .30 .56 .56 .58 .57 .61
Italy .30 .52 .64 .53 .55 .59 .32 .52 .73 .62 .54 .61
Spain .32 .56 .74 .70 .62 .66 .35 .49 .65 .63 .62 .65
Portugal .36 .62 .61 .59 .60 .62 .41 .50 .65 .55 .65 .65
Mean .31 .58 .64 .53 .58 .62 .35 .52 .65 .59 .59 .63
Rest of Europe:
Austria .36 .53 .71 .69 .60 .67 .33 .50 .78 .60 .54 .60
Belgium .30 .45 .86 .67 .56 .62 .27 .47 .78 .85 .62 .62
Ireland .41 .53 .88 .53 .57 .60 .53 .55 .80 1.00 .56 .60
United Kingdom .51 .59 .32 .69 .56 .60 .47 .57 .70 .58 .56 .61
Netherlands .19 .47 1.00 .22 .49 .55 .29 .42 .57 .63 .55 .56
France .35 .51 .52 .66 .63 .62 .31 .51 .63 .45 .58 .63
Finland .23 .47 .73 .84 .61 .60 .26 .50 .72 .71 .61 .61
Denmark .47 .39 1.00 .68 .60 .63 .16 .34 1.00 1.00 .68 .63
Norway .25 .40 .74 .70 .62 .66 .42 .50 .65 .63 .62 .65
Mean .34 .48 .75 .63 .58 .62 .34 .48 .74 .72 .59 .61
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: Wage imputation rule: Impute wage < median when
nonemployed and spouse income in bottom quartile; impute wage > median when nonemployed and
spouse income in top quartile. Imputation Rate = proportion of imputed wage observations in total
nonemployment. Goodness Method 1 = proportion of imputed wage observations on the same side of
the median as wage observations from other waves in the panel. Goodness Method 2 = proportion of
employed workers on the same side of the median as predicted by the imputation rule.
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Table 8: Rate of Imputation Based on Wages from Other Waves
2007 2012
M F M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .23 .11 .32 .17
Italy .28 .14 .35 .16
Spain .42 .26 .46 .30
Portugal .60 .59 .62 .62
Mean .38 .28 .44 .31
Rest of Europe:
Austria .31 .36 .33 .28
Belgium .22 .14 .30 .16
Ireland .18 .12 .09 .08
United Kingdom .16 .17 .15 .14
Netherlands .25 .16 .30 .20
France .46 .43 .49 .34
Finland .52 .48 .24 .36
Denmark .47 .60 .23 .28
Norway .55 .64 .32 .32
Mean .35 .34 .27 .24
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calcula-
tions. Note: Wage imputation rule: Im-
pute wage from other waves when nonem-
ployed. Imputation Rate = proportion of
imputed wage observations in total nonem-
ployment.
Table 9: Employment Rates by Education
Employment Rate in 2007 Changes over 2007-2012
College No college College No college
M F M F M F M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .977 .681 .965 .567 -.213 -.142 -.276 -.114
Italy .946 .673 .944 .618 .009 .001 -.068 -.003
Spain .977 .810 .964 .730 -.122 -.081 -.192 -.098
Portugal .946 .835 .936 .788 -.074 -.009 -.088 -.025
Mean .962 .750 .952 .676 -.100 -.058 -.156 -.060
Rest of Europe:
Austria .962 .768 .944 .752 .020 .001 -.003 .014
Belgium .950 .849 .914 .768 -.038 .028 -.034 .022
Ireland .973 .721 .965 .607 -.107 -.122 -.210 -.104
United Kingdom .979 .816 .972 .797 -.008 -.014 -.065 -.057
Netherlands .950 .853 .957 .815 .004 .003 -.059 -.038
France .988 .886 .977 .856 -.011 .004 -.049 -.012
Finland .988 .888 .987 .913 -.015 -.025 -.030 -.067
Denmark .995 .955 .990 .952 -.144 -.003 -.114 -.086
Norway .982 .921 .988 .933 -.017 .008 -.014 -.002
Mean .974 .851 .966 .821 -.035 -.013 -.064 -.037
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations.
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Figure 8: Cross-country wage inequality, 2007-2012.
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Notes.— Wage inequality is measured by logarithm of the ratio between wages at 90th and 10th percentiles. Source: EU-SILC
and authors’ calculations.
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Table 10: LFP Rates by Education
LFP Rate in 2007 Changes over 2007-2012
College No college College No college
M F M F M F M F
Southern Europe:
Greece .977 .681 .965 .567 .005 .011 -.024 .053
Italy .946 .673 .944 .618 .043 .052 .025 .024
Spain .977 .810 .964 .730 .002 .040 .025 .079
Portugal .946 .835 .936 .788 -.005 .051 .039 .073
Mean .962 .750 .952 .676 .011 .038 .016 .057
Rest of Europe:
Austria .962 .768 .944 .752 .009 -.013 .010 .022
Belgium .950 .849 .914 .768 .009 .031 -.008 .039
Ireland .973 .721 .965 .607 .016 -.067 .014 -.027
United Kingdom .979 .816 .972 .797 -.002 -.005 -.019 -.025
Netherlands .950 .853 .957 .815 .040 .029 .014 .020
France .988 .886 .977 .856 .005 .006 -.004 .008
Finland .988 .888 .987 .913 -.004 -.003 -.007 -.057
Denmark .995 .955 .990 .952 -.004 .028 -.043 .024
Norway .982 .921 .988 .933 -.002 .011 -.005 .015
Mean .974 .851 .966 .821 .007 .002 -.005 .002
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations.
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Samples Used
2007 2012
Males Females Males Females
N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD
Greece
Employed 1799 .85 .35 2320 .54 .50 1205 .60 .49 1559 .43 .50
Unemployed 1799 .11 .31 2320 .11 .31 1205 .35 .48 1559 .27 .45
Inactive 1799 .04 .19 2320 .35 .48 1205 .05 .22 1559 .30 .46
Annual Earnings 1651 21.63 15.73 1383 16.10 10.44 839 17.38 12.58 729 14.26 9.05
Annual Hours 1587 2073 506 1322 1770 575 810 1891 565 707 1707 597
Log(hourly wage) 1587 2.02 .57 1322 1.90 .56 810 1.80 .49 707 1.72 .53
Age 1799 38.80 8.42 2320 38.92 8.43 1205 38.77 8.50 1559 39.22 8.44
Educ1 1789 .27 .44 2311 .28 .45 1203 .21 .40 1555 .21 .41
Educ2 1789 .41 .49 2311 .35 .48 1203 .43 .50 1555 .38 .49
Educ3 1789 .26 .44 2311 .30 .46 1203 .28 .45 1555 .34 .47
Experience 1799 16.76 9.60 2320 10.19 9.08 1205 15.39 9.94 1559 10.24 9.19
Temporary 1580 .21 .41 1315 .23 .42 666 .15 .36 591 .17 .37
Spouse 1st quartile 1799 .36 .48 2320 .34 .47 1205 .37 .48 1559 .40 .49
Spouse 2nd quartile 1799 .08 .27 2320 .11 .31 1205 .05 .22 1559 .07 .26
Spouse 3rd quartile 1799 .09 .29 2320 .13 .34 1205 .07 .25 1559 .11 .31
Spouse 4th quartile 1799 .09 .28 2320 .16 .37 1205 .08 .27 1559 .12 .33
Italy
Employed 7848 .85 .36 9534 .56 .50 4341 .79 .41 5311 .56 .50
Unemployed 7848 .09 .29 9534 .10 .30 4341 .17 .38 5311 .13 .33
Inactive 7848 .06 .24 9534 .35 .48 4341 .03 .18 5311 .31 .46
Annual Earnings 7068 19.05 8.90 6123 14.45 7.35 3851 19.02 10.64 3576 14.56 8.02
Annual Hours 6703 2089 436 5349 1716 521 3535 2011 449 3138 1716 506
Log(hourly wage) 6703 2.03 .42 5349 1.99 .46 3535 1.95 .50 3138 1.86 .52
Age 7848 39.68 8.21 9534 40.08 8.05 4341 40.40 8.20 5311 41.15 8.04
Educ1 7818 .44 .50 9500 .40 .49 4318 .39 .49 5298 .36 .48
Educ2 7818 .39 .49 9500 .38 .49 4318 .43 .50 5298 .43 .49
Educ3 7818 .13 .34 9500 .16 .37 4318 .15 .35 5298 .18 .38
Experience 7848 16.82 9.58 9534 11.54 9.18 4341 17.59 9.29 5311 13.36 9.19
Temporary 6487 .10 .30 5243 .14 .35 3336 .09 .29 2958 .12 .33
Spouse 1st quartile 7848 .36 .48 9534 .30 .46 4341 .35 .48 5311 .29 .46
Spouse 2nd quartile 7848 .08 .28 9534 .12 .32 4341 .09 .29 5311 .12 .32
Spouse 3rd quartile 7848 .08 .28 9534 .13 .34 4341 .08 .28 5311 .13 .34
Spouse 4th quartile 7848 .08 .27 9534 .15 .36 4341 .08 .28 5311 .16 .36
Spain
Employed 5908 .89 .31 7022 .67 .47 3512 .72 .45 4129 .60 .49
Unemployed 5908 .08 .27 7022 .11 .31 3512 .27 .44 4129 .26 .44
Inactive 5908 .03 .17 7022 .22 .41 3512 .01 .11 4129 .15 .35
Annual Earnings 5506 17.47 8.93 5035 13.05 8.19 3029 16.66 11.10 2893 13.19 9.52
Annual Hours 5282 2107 489 4658 1760 597 2662 1931 576 2531 1652 642
Log(hourly wage) 5282 1.85 .48 4656 1.72 .54 2642 1.83 .61 2512 1.72 .63
Age 5908 38.36 8.29 7022 38.86 8.25 3512 39.81 8.08 4129 40.22 8.02
Educ1 5832 .41 .49 6908 .39 .49 3427 .42 .49 4020 .35 .48
Educ2 5832 .23 .42 6908 .25 .43 3427 .24 .43 4020 .24 .43
Educ3 5832 .35 .48 6908 .35 .48 3427 .34 .47 4020 .41 .49
Experience 5842 18.03 9.75 6964 13.05 9.23 3510 13.69 11.55 4125 9.76 10.45
Temporary 5028 .23 .42 4461 .28 .45 2464 .20 .40 2304 .24 .43
Spouse 1st quartile 5908 .33 .47 7022 .26 .44 3512 .33 .47 4129 .27 .45
Spouse 2nd quartile 5908 .10 .31 7022 .13 .34 3512 .11 .31 4129 .13 .33
Spouse 3rd quartile 5908 .10 .30 7022 .14 .35 3512 .10 .30 4129 .15 .36
Spouse 4th quartile 5908 .11 .31 7022 .17 .38 3512 .11 .32 4129 .18 .38
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: The descriptive statistics refer to the base samples, aged 25-
54, excluding the self-employed, those in the military, and those in full-time education. Description of variables:
Employed, unemployed, and inactive are self-defined. Educ1=1 if less than upper secondary education. Educ2=1 if
upper secondary education completed. Educ3=1 if higher education. Married=1 if living in a couple.
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Samples Used
2007 2012
Males Females Males Females
N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD
Portugal
Employed 1880 .84 .37 2250 .71 .45 1803 .75 .43 2124 .69 .46
Unemployed 1880 .10 .30 2250 .10 .30 1803 .22 .41 2124 .19 .39
Inactive 1880 .06 .24 2250 .19 .39 1803 .03 .17 2124 .12 .33
Annual Earnings 1658 10.91 7.10 1631 8.81 6.10 1458 11.15 6.91 1575 9.36 5.83
Annual Hours 1639 2092 431 1625 1863 505 1408 2096 553 1524 1926 514
Log(hourly wage) 1635 1.38 .51 1602 1.25 .58 1406 1.34 .49 1521 1.26 .49
Age 1880 38.45 8.73 2250 39.61 8.57 1803 40.50 8.32 2124 40.65 8.10
Educ1 1831 .72 .45 2185 .66 .47 1759 .63 .48 2073 .53 .50
Educ2 1831 .16 .37 2185 .15 .36 1759 .22 .41 2073 .23 .42
Educ3 1831 .11 .32 2185 .18 .39 1759 .15 .35 2073 .23 .42
Experience 1874 19.59 10.55 2247 17.18 10.63 1800 21.63 10.51 2124 18.92 10.11
Temporary 1556 .17 .38 1546 .21 .41 1260 .14 .35 1372 .14 .35
Spouse 1st quartile 1880 .31 .46 2250 .29 .46 1803 .33 .47 2124 .29 .45
Spouse 2nd quartile 1880 .10 .30 2250 .12 .32 1803 .13 .33 2124 .13 .34
Spouse 3rd quartile 1880 .10 .30 2250 .13 .34 1803 .13 .34 2124 .13 .34
Spouse 4th quartile 1880 .08 .28 2250 .16 .37 1803 .12 .33 2124 .15 .36
Austria
Employed 2329 .88 .33 2647 .71 .45 1522 .88 .32 1769 .72 .45
Unemployed 2329 .07 .25 2647 .06 .23 1522 .08 .27 1769 .06 .24
Inactive 2329 .05 .22 2647 .23 .42 1522 .04 .20 1769 .22 .41
Annual Earnings 2176 36.11 21.83 2033 23.05 36.77 1348 43.29 31.89 1425 24.64 17.84
Annual Hours 2098 2118 430 1905 1623 626 1365 2108 491 1311 1605 598
Log(hourly wage) 2090 2.61 .50 1892 2.39 .56 1275 2.66 .64 1226 2.44 .58
Age 2329 40.40 8.16 2647 40.25 8.23 1522 40.74 8.70 1769 40.90 8.44
Educ1 2329 .09 .29 2647 .16 .37 1522 .10 .30 1769 .17 .38
Educ2 2329 .59 .49 2647 .50 .50 1522 .56 .50 1769 .48 .50
Educ3 2329 .21 .41 2647 .18 .39 1522 .22 .42 1769 .18 .39
Experience 2328 21.28 9.26 2646 16.63 9.56 1522 22.10 9.79 1768 17.66 9.63
Temporary 2084 .04 .19 1845 .06 .24 1342 .05 .21 1265 .06 .24
Spouse 1st quartile 2329 .37 .48 2647 .27 .44 1522 .34 .47 1769 .29 .45
Spouse 2nd quartile 2329 .12 .33 2647 .12 .33 1522 .15 .35 1769 .13 .34
Spouse 3rd quartile 2329 .11 .31 2647 .15 .36 1522 .10 .30 1769 .14 .35
Spouse 4th quartile 2329 .09 .28 2647 .17 .38 1522 .11 .31 1769 .15 .36
Belgium
Employed 2458 .87 .34 2802 .74 .44 1517 .83 .37 1715 .77 .42
Unemployed 2458 .07 .25 2802 .08 .27 1517 .10 .30 1715 .08 .28
Inactive 2458 .07 .25 2802 .18 .39 1517 .07 .25 1715 .14 .35
Annual Earnings 2227 35.46 18.82 2140 25.38 13.26 1373 40.28 22.03 1387 30.77 17.25
Annual Hours 2152 2048 510 2001 1650 555 1332 2019 479 1301 1648 546
Log(hourly wage) 2150 2.64 .42 1962 2.54 .45 1332 2.69 .39 1292 2.63 .41
Age 2458 39.89 8.47 2802 39.97 8.61 1517 40.01 8.50 1715 39.95 8.74
Educ1 2373 .24 .43 2709 .22 .41 1502 .20 .40 1697 .18 .38
Educ2 2373 .37 .48 2709 .33 .47 1502 .34 .47 1697 .31 .46
Educ3 2373 .37 .48 2709 .43 .49 1502 .42 .49 1697 .48 .50
Experience 2443 18.38 9.94 2789 15.09 10.02 1497 16.50 9.86 1684 14.42 9.94
Temporary 2136 .05 .23 2046 .11 .31 1280 .07 .26 1309 .10 .30
Spouse 1st quartile 2458 .31 .46 2802 .25 .44 1517 .28 .45 1715 .25 .43
Spouse 2nd quartile 2458 .13 .34 2802 .14 .35 1517 .12 .33 1715 .14 .34
Spouse 3rd quartile 2458 .13 .33 2802 .16 .37 1517 .14 .34 1715 .15 .35
Spouse 4th quartile 2458 .12 .32 2802 .17 .37 1517 .12 .33 1715 .18 .38
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: The descriptive statistics refer to the base samples, aged 25-
54, excluding the self-employed, those in the military, and those in full-time education. Description of variables:
Employed, unemployed, and inactive are self-defined. Educ1=1 if less than upper secondary education. Educ2=1 if
upper secondary education completed. Educ3=1 if higher education. Married=1 if living in a couple.
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Table 11: Descriptive Statistics of Samples Used
2007 2012
Males Females Males Females
N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD
Ireland
Employed 1326 .85 .36 1820 .67 .47 1269 .71 .45 1661 .59 .49
Unemployed 1326 .11 .32 1820 .03 .17 1269 .27 .44 1661 .10 .29
Inactive 1326 .04 .19 1820 .30 .46 1269 .02 .14 1661 .31 .46
Annual Earnings 1184 44.67 35.96 1283 27.34 21.69 945 47.03 112.74 1049 31.75 32.40
Annual Hours 1145 2015 543 1202 1467 633 896 1897 608 1006 1514 630
Log(hourly wage) 1141 2.80 .56 1193 2.64 .62 884 2.83 .61 995 2.70 .63
Age 1326 41.00 8.33 1820 41.26 8.28 1269 39.69 8.10 1661 39.30 8.13
Educ1 1293 .34 .47 1790 .30 .46 1213 .23 .42 1608 .17 .38
Educ2 1293 .23 .42 1790 .25 .43 1213 .23 .42 1608 .23 .42
Educ3 1293 .35 .48 1790 .35 .48 1213 .50 .50 1608 .49 .50
Experience 1313 20.69 9.69 1786 15.89 9.03 1260 18.15 9.40 1654 14.21 8.96
Temporary 1121 .04 .21 1192 .08 .28 865 .07 .26 959 .08 .27
Spouse 1st quartile 1326 .36 .48 1820 .31 .46 1269 .41 .49 1661 .35 .48
Spouse 2nd quartile 1326 .11 .31 1820 .10 .30 1269 .11 .32 1661 .11 .31
Spouse 3rd quartile 1326 .09 .29 1820 .13 .33 1269 .12 .32 1661 .11 .32
Spouse 4th quartile 1326 .12 .32 1820 .14 .35 1269 .11 .32 1661 .13 .33
United Kingdom
Employed 2825 .94 .23 3748 .81 .40 3655 .91 .29 4434 .78 .41
Unemployed 2825 .03 .17 3748 .02 .12 3655 .06 .23 4434 .04 .19
Inactive 2825 .03 .16 3748 .18 .38 3655 .04 .19 4434 .18 .39
Annual Earnings 2638 47.77 35.88 3030 28.00 21.33 3206 42.46 43.13 3331 26.46 23.67
Annual Hours 2601 2267 509 2910 1694 663 3255 2236 560 3387 1709 671
Log(hourly wage) 2570 2.81 .55 2836 2.56 .60 3108 2.50 .59 3185 2.32 .54
Age 2825 40.09 8.01 3748 40.05 8.14 3655 39.91 8.29 4434 40.01 8.30
Educ1 2736 .08 .26 3646 .09 .28 3418 .09 .28 4199 .08 .27
Educ2 2736 .55 .50 3646 .57 .50 3418 .45 .50 4199 .44 .50
Educ3 2736 .33 .47 3646 .32 .47 3418 .46 .50 4199 .48 .50
Experience 1674 19.56 9.64 2368 15.97 9.04 3650 19.06 9.77 4423 17.08 9.91
Temporary 2562 .03 .17 2868 .04 .19 3173 .03 .17 3311 .03 .18
Spouse 1st quartile 2825 .32 .47 3748 .29 .45 3655 .35 .48 4434 .30 .46
Spouse 2nd quartile 2825 .15 .35 3748 .15 .35 3655 .12 .33 4434 .14 .35
Spouse 3rd quartile 2825 .14 .34 3748 .14 .35 3655 .12 .33 4434 .15 .36
Spouse 4th quartile 2825 .13 .34 3748 .16 .36 3655 .13 .34 4434 .16 .37
Netherlands
Employed 2315 .93 .25 2712 .80 .40 1394 .90 .30 1689 .78 .41
Unemployed 2315 .02 .13 2712 .04 .19 1394 .07 .26 1689 .08 .28
Inactive 2315 .05 .22 2712 .16 .37 1394 .02 .15 1689 .13 .34
Annual Earnings 2267 44.00 33.61 2393 24.12 14.97 1362 46.48 23.87 1506 28.36 18.44
Annual Hours 2048 1949 367 2145 1358 477 1307 1939 393 1398 1385 467
Log(hourly wage) 2046 2.92 .48 2139 2.68 .58 1307 2.90 .50 1398 2.76 .52
Age 2315 40.32 8.41 2712 39.96 8.28 1394 40.73 8.45 1689 40.66 8.36
Educ1 2278 .18 .38 2663 .20 .40 1378 .15 .36 1681 .17 .38
Educ2 2278 .37 .48 2663 .42 .49 1378 .36 .48 1681 .42 .49
Educ3 2278 .42 .49 2663 .33 .47 1378 .44 .50 1681 .38 .49
Experience 2304 17.77 9.76 2672 14.00 8.65 1378 18.01 9.22 1665 15.04 8.66
Temporary 2133 .12 .33 2220 .14 .35 1244 .12 .33 1358 .14 .35
Spouse 1st quartile 2315 .30 .46 2712 .19 .40 1394 .30 .46 1689 .21 .41
Spouse 2nd quartile 2315 .15 .36 2712 .17 .38 1394 .15 .36 1689 .16 .37
Spouse 3rd quartile 2315 .13 .34 2712 .18 .38 1394 .15 .35 1689 .19 .39
Spouse 4th quartile 2315 .14 .35 2712 .22 .42 1394 .11 .32 1689 .19 .40
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: The descriptive statistics refer to the base samples, aged 25-54,
excluding the self-employed, those in the military, and those in full-time education. Description of variables: Em-
ployed, unemployed, and inactive are self-defined. Educ1=1 if less than upper secondary education. Educ2=1 if upper
secondary education completed. Educ3=1 if higher education. Married=1 if living in a couple.
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2007 2012
Males Females Males Females
N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD
France
Employed 4121 .92 .28 4624 .82 .39 3426 .88 .32 3749 .82 .39
Unemployed 4121 .06 .24 4624 .07 .25 3426 .10 .29 3749 .08 .27
Inactive 4121 .02 .14 4624 .11 .32 3426 .02 .14 3749 .10 .30
Annual Earnings 3969 24.40 16.81 4098 16.64 10.53 3248 25.82 16.37 3375 18.48 11.63
Annual Hours 3783 2070 516 3732 1684 579 3086 2033 538 3025 1719 579
Log(hourly wage) 3779 2.25 .51 3704 2.09 .60 3084 2.27 .50 3022 2.11 .59
Age 4121 40.26 8.20 4624 40.50 8.31 3426 40.37 8.31 3749 40.69 8.33
Educ1 4117 .19 .39 4610 .22 .41 3415 .13 .34 3742 .14 .35
Educ2 4117 .49 .50 4610 .43 .50 3415 .52 .50 3742 .45 .50
Educ3 4117 .32 .47 4610 .35 .48 3415 .35 .48 3742 .40 .49
Experience 4105 19.08 9.91 4621 16.03 9.88 3410 19.16 9.66 3742 16.34 9.60
Temporary 3592 .10 .29 3644 .16 .36 2981 .11 .32 3032 .14 .35
Spouse 1st quartile 4121 .31 .46 4624 .25 .44 3426 .29 .45 3749 .24 .43
Spouse 2nd quartile 4121 .17 .37 4624 .16 .37 3426 .17 .37 3749 .17 .37
Spouse 3rd quartile 4121 .16 .36 4624 .18 .38 3426 .16 .37 3749 .17 .38
Spouse 4th quartile 4121 .15 .35 4624 .18 .39 3426 .14 .34 3749 .18 .39
Finland
Employed 1128 .90 .30 1254 .86 .34 1299 .88 .33 1419 .83 .38
Unemployed 1128 .09 .29 1254 .04 .20 1299 .10 .31 1419 .05 .22
Inactive 1128 .01 .11 1254 .09 .29 1299 .02 .14 1419 .12 .33
Annual Earnings 1079 36.19 22.83 1176 25.69 14.12 1217 41.87 23.00 1317 31.86 17.59
Annual Hours 1017 1985 500 1035 1813 485 1125 1984 439 1125 1819 468
Log(hourly wage) 1005 2.74 .49 1031 2.54 .45 1114 2.78 .45 1120 2.66 .44
Age 1128 39.66 8.63 1254 40.00 8.65 1299 39.66 8.70 1419 40.11 8.58
Educ1 1116 .12 .32 1248 .11 .31 1282 .10 .30 1399 .05 .21
Educ2 1116 .49 .50 1248 .39 .49 1282 .48 .50 1399 .34 .47
Educ3 1116 .39 .49 1248 .50 .50 1282 .42 .49 1399 .60 .49
Experience 1071 16.59 9.84 1185 15.94 10.18 1273 16.93 9.79 1377 16.21 9.64
Temporary 1030 .11 .31 1072 .19 .39 1073 .08 .27 1059 .13 .33
Spouse 1st quartile 1128 .26 .44 1254 .21 .41 1299 .29 .46 1419 .21 .41
Spouse 2nd quartile 1128 .11 .32 1254 .14 .35 1299 .15 .36 1419 .14 .35
Spouse 3rd quartile 1128 .13 .34 1254 .16 .37 1299 .11 .31 1419 .15 .36
Spouse 4th quartile 1128 .13 .33 1254 .14 .35 1299 .11 .31 1419 .16 .36
Denmark
Employed 1503 .98 .12 1762 .94 .23 565 .86 .35 636 .90 .30
Unemployed 1503 .01 .08 1762 .01 .12 565 .11 .31 636 .09 .28
Inactive 1503 .01 .09 1762 .04 .21 565 .03 .18 636 .02 .13
Annual Earnings 1434 47.98 26.57 1685 36.72 15.99 550 53.01 27.70 606 44.30 18.36
Annual Hours 1480 2064 409 1679 1829 362 535 1988 494 575 1799 381
Log(hourly wage) 1413 2.90 .69 1633 2.80 .61 528 3.01 .69 562 2.97 .38
Age 1503 40.07 8.17 1762 39.98 8.10 565 40.72 8.13 636 40.28 8.33
Educ1 1492 .19 .39 1753 .16 .37 557 .11 .31 628 .08 .27
Educ2 1492 .48 .50 1753 .41 .49 557 .50 .50 628 .43 .50
Educ3 1492 .34 .47 1753 .43 .49 557 .40 .49 628 .49 .50
Experience 1497 18.52 9.39 1758 16.05 9.52 561 19.15 10.13 629 17.44 10.06
Temporary 1431 .00 .00 1657 .00 .00 519 .08 .27 562 .05 .22
Spouse 1st quartile 1503 .19 .39 1762 .17 .37 565 .22 .41 636 .20 .40
Spouse 2nd quartile 1503 .15 .35 1762 .12 .33 565 .09 .29 636 .12 .32
Spouse 3rd quartile 1503 .12 .32 1762 .15 .36 565 .10 .29 636 .15 .35
Spouse 4th quartile 1503 .13 .33 1762 .19 .39 565 .12 .33 636 .19 .40
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: The descriptive statistics refer to the base samples, aged 25-
54, excluding the self-employed, those in the military, and those in full-time education. Description of variables:
Employed, unemployed, and inactive are self-defined. Educ1=1 if less than upper secondary education. Educ2=1 if
upper secondary education completed. Educ3=1 if higher education. Married=1 if living in a couple.
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2007 2012
Males Females Males Females
N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD
Norway
Employed 1379 .97 .16 1222 .91 .28 1698 .96 .20 1770 .92 .28
Unemployed 1379 .01 .10 1222 .02 .12 1698 .02 .14 1770 .02 .15
Inactive 1379 .02 .13 1222 .07 .26 1698 .02 .14 1770 .06 .24
Annual Earnings 1337 58.85 111.68 1176 35.52 19.94 1640 77.84 64.33 1681 50.81 26.40
Annual Hours 1330 2107 451 1090 1764 511 1629 2113 407 1624 1843 464
Log(hourly wage) 1296 3.04 .71 1077 2.80 .69 1590 3.31 .58 1595 3.04 .59
Age 1379 39.59 8.14 1222 39.79 8.23 1698 41.38 8.15 1770 41.14 7.90
Educ1 1328 .17 .37 1180 .13 .34 1670 .10 .30 1738 .11 .31
Educ2 1328 .43 .50 1180 .35 .48 1670 .39 .49 1738 .30 .46
Educ3 1328 .37 .48 1180 .48 .50 1670 .45 .50 1738 .57 .49
Experience 1379 18.02 9.66 1222 15.98 9.25 960 19.94 8.99 822 17.47 9.03
Temporary 1279 .05 .21 1122 .10 .30 891 .04 .20 770 .09 .28
Spouse 1st quartile 1379 .21 .41 1222 .18 .38 1698 .29 .45 1770 .25 .43
Spouse 2nd quartile 1379 .13 .33 1222 .14 .34 1698 .17 .38 1770 .18 .39
Spouse 3rd quartile 1379 .11 .31 1222 .12 .32 1698 .18 .39 1770 .20 .40
Spouse 4th quartile 1379 .10 .30 1222 .16 .37 1698 .18 .38 1770 .22 .41
Source: EU-SILC and authors’ calculations. Note: The descriptive statistics refer to the base samples, aged 25-54,
excluding the self-employed, those in the military, and those in full-time education. Description of variables: Em-
ployed, unemployed, and inactive are self-defined. Educ1=1 if less than upper secondary education. Educ2=1 if upper
secondary education completed. Educ3=1 if higher education. Married=1 if living in a couple.
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